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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is defying clear and
unanimous Supreme Court precedent and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure by imposing a heightened factual pleading standard in
reviewing motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).2 The Supreme Court has consistently held that where a
complaint puts the defendant on notice of the existence and nature of
the claim against him, it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to allege
1. lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002).
2. Rule 12(b) authorizes parties to make any of seven enumerated defenses by
motion prior to filing their responsive pleading. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b). These defenses
are "(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join a
party under Rule 19." Id.
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factual details or to plead specifically the existence of each element of
a cause of action. In contrast, Fourth Circuit panels continue to
follow circuit precedent requiring plaintiffs to explicitly allege facts
supporting each element, often with sufficient factual detail to
establish a prima facie case.
This Comment begins in Part I by reviewing the language and
history of the Rules' notice pleading system. Part II surveys the
Supreme Court's pleading jurisprudence3 and establishes that a Rule
12(b)(6) motion cannot legitimately be granted for failure to allege
facts supporting the existence of each necessary element. Part III
then examines several representative Fourth Circuit holdings and
argues that the Fourth Circuit's pleading rule defies clear Supreme
Court precedent. In Part IV, this Comment explores possible
explanations for the persistence of Fourth Circuit judges in dismissing
complaints for failure to allege facts establishing a prima facie case
and concludes by arguing in Part V that continued adherence to
factual pleading requirements is unjustified and harmful to judicial
principles and litigants.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NOTICE PLEADING
The common law pleading practice that developed in England
between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries required plaintiffs to
choose a single writ under which to bring their claims.4 Each writ
triggered a different form of action with distinct procedural,
evidentiary, and jurisdictional requirements.5 Common law pleading
developed into a complex and formalistic system under which
plaintiff and defendant exchanged hyper-technical pleadings in an
attempt to reduce the case to a single legal or factual issue.6 Plaintiffs
often lost their cases on technical pleading grounds without a court
ever reaching the merits of their claims.7 Although less sophisticated,
3. The Court's three leading notice pleading cases are Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506 (2002), Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
4. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914-15 (1987). See
generally J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCrION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 53-95 (4th ed.
2002) (describing the rise and decline of the writ system and common law pleadings in
England); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETFr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
399-418 (5th ed. 1956) (surveying the development of English common law pleading
practices).
5. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 915.
6. Id. at 916-17; see, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *293-324
(describing eighteenth century pleading practices).
7. See supra Subrin, note 4, at 917.
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early American pleading practice followed the English common law
model and continued to increase in technicalities through the early
nineteenth century.8
The first reforms of this formalistic system originated with David
Dudley Field, who drafted the 1848 New York pleading code ("Field
Code"). 9  Eventually about half the states adopted pleading
procedures based on the Field Code."° Although the Field Code
adopted a single form of action and eliminated many of the other
technicalities of common law pleading," the Field Code pleading still
required plaintiffs to allege "facts constituting the cause of action."12
As the Field Code spread across the country, many judges did not
take to its liberalizing spirit and seized on the factual requirement to
continue demanding highly detailed and technical pleadings.13
In an effort to reform and standardize procedure in federal court
and respond to the failings of the Field Code's factual pleading
requirements, the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1937.4 Rule 8(a)(2) established a liberal, notice
pleading standard that embodied the Rules' departure from code
pleading's factual requirements."5 In laying out the Rules' pleading
requirements, the drafters of Rule 8(a)(2) explicitly avoided using the
8. See id. at 927-28. See generally BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HAND-BOOK OF
COMMON LAW PLEADING (1894) (surveying American common law pleading practice).
9. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986).
10. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 939.
11. See id. at 933-38.
12. An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the
Courts of this State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521 (repealed); see also Van
Giesen v. Van Giesen, 10 N.Y. 316, 317 (1852) (requiring under the Code of 1848 "a
statement of the facts constituting the cause of action"); Hartsfield v. Bryan, 177 N.C. 166,
169, 98 S.E. 379, 380 (1919) ("[A]I the facts going to make up the cause of action must be
stated .... Looseness in pleading and inadequacy of allegation are as much condemned
by the present code of procedure as they were under the former strict and exacting system
of the common law.").
13. See Marcus, supra note 9, at 438 (noting that the failure of the Field Code's
reforms was attributable in part to "judicial sabotage"); Subrin, supra note 4, at 940
(discussing the resistance to the Field Code's new procedures).
14. See Edward Cavanagh, Pleading Rules in Antitrust Cases: A Return to Fact
Pleading?, 21 REV. LITIG. 1, 3-5 (2002); Marcus, supra note 9, at 434, 439; Paul J.
McArdle, A Short and Plain Statement: The Significance of Leatherman v. Tarrant
County, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 19, 21-23 (1994). The Rules took effect in 1938 when
Congress adjourned without taking action on them. McArdle, supra, at 22.
15. Rule 8(a) states that a pleading making a claim for relief must contain (1) an
allegation of the basis for jurisdiction, "(2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and (3) a demand for relief. FED. R. Civ. P.
8(a).
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charged term "facts."' 6  The contrast between the general pleading
standard of Rule 8(a) and the requirement to plead certain "Special
Matters" with factual "particularity" 17 under Rule 9 also highlighted
the liberal nature of the Rules' basic notice pleading scheme.'"
Where in the past, pleadings had become a virtual end in themselves,
under the Rules the purpose of pleading procedure became
facilitation of decisions on the merits.19
The example pleadings attached to the Rules emphasized-and
continue to emphasize-how brief and conclusory acceptable
complaints can be." Form 9, for example, made out a negligence
claim by simply stating that "[o]n June 1, 1936, in a public highway
called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then
crossing said highway."21 The complaint did not specifically allege the
16. Marcus, supra note 9, at 439 (reporting also that Charles E. Clark, the Reporter of
the Supreme Court Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules, initially proposed
eliminating pleading motions altogether); see FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
17. Rule 9, entitled "Pleading Special Matters," requires parties to plead "with
particularity" certain enumerated issues, such as lack of capacity to be sued, circumstances
of fraud or mistake, denial of performance, and special damages. FED. R. CIV. P. 9. For
example, Rule 9(b) states, "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
However, Rule 9(b) concludes by noting that "[mlalice, intent, knowledge, and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." Id.
18. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002).
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f) ("All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice."); see also Cavanagh, supra note 14, at 3-5 ("Whereas the goal of the Federal
Rules is to assure that meritorious claims are heard on the merits, the goal of common law
pleading was to avoid trial."); Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEx. L.
REV. 551, 554-58 (2002) (discussing strengths and weaknesses of notice pleading and
Code pleading); Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of
Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 327-28 (2001) (contrasting code
pleading's requirement to allege facts supporting each element of a cause of action with
the Rules' notice pleading standard).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 84 ("The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient
under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which
the rules contemplate."); see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 n.4 (identifying Form 9 as
an example of how little detail is actually required).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. FORM 9. Form 9's complete, sufficient "Complaint for
Negligence" reads as follows:
1. Allegation of jurisdiction.
2. On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston,
Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who
was then crossing said highway.
3. As a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg broken and was
otherwise injured, was prevented from transacting his business, suffered great
pain of body and mind, and incurred expenses for medical attention and
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existence of each element of a negligence claim, nor did it assert any
factual basis for its conclusory allegation that the defendant was
negligent.22 As required by Rule 9(g), 23 Form 9 alleged the plaintiff's
special damages with particularity; but to plead the negligence itself,
Form 9 required nothing more than giving notice of when and where
the claim arose and of the plaintiff's assertion that defendant acted
negligently.24 Similarly, Form 11 made out an adequate complaint for
conversion by identifying the property in question and then making a
simple, conclusory allegation that the defendant converted it to his
own use.2 ' Form 12 stated a contract claim by merely alleging that the
parties "entered into an agreement" without separately alleging the
existence of offer and acceptance.26
The leading early judicial interpretation of the Rules' new,
liberal pleading system came from Judge Charles E. Clark in
Dioguardi v. Durning.27 The district court in Dioguardi dismissed a
complaint "on the ground that it 'fail[ed] to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.' "28 In reversing and remanding, Judge
Clark stated emphatically that under the Rules "there is no pleading
requirement of stating 'facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.' "29 Rather, all the Rules require, Judge Clark held, is Rule
8(a)'s short and plain statement giving notice and showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief.3"
During the early 1950s there were several unsuccessful
challenges to the Rules' notice pleading. Federal trial judges in the
Southern District of New York carried out what then Chief Judge
Clark described as "something bordering on a revolt" against the use
hospitalization in the sum of one thousand dollars.




23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(g) ("When items of special damage are claimed, they shall
be specifically stated.").
24. See FED. R. Civ. P. FORM 9.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. FORM 11.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. FORM 12.
27. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). While Dean of Yale Law School, Judge Clark served
as the Reporter of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules. See
Subrin, supra note 4, at 961. Judge Clark is widely regarded as the Rules' principle
architect, see id., giving his interpretation of the Rules' pleading requirements in
Dioguardi special salience.
28. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Supreme Court subsequently cited Judge Clark's holding as representing
"the accepted rule." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).
2004] 1171
1172 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
of notice pleading in large, antitrust cases.3 Writing for the Second
Circuit, Chief Judge Clark rebuffed these judicial attempts to create a
fact pleading requirement in antitrust cases.32  A more direct
challenge came in 1952, when the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference
passed a resolution endorsing the amendment to Rule 8(a)(2) to read
"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, which statement shall contain the facts constituting a
cause of action."33  The Ninth Circuit's proposed amendment was
never adopted, and today, Rule 8(a)(2) retains its original 1938
language.34
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S NOTICE PLEADING HOLDINGS
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and unanimously affirmed
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe a notice pleading
system that does not require plaintiffs to plead detailed factual
support for their claims so long as defendants receive fair notice of
the nature and basis of the claims against them.35 The Court first
established this interpretation of the Rules in Conley v. Gibson.36 The
Court has subsequently reiterated the Rules' notice pleading standard
in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
31. Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case", 21 F.R.D. 45, 49-50 (1957).
Chief Judge Clark said of the district judges' actions that "[i]n asserting a special rule of
pleading for antitrust cases, our brothers below have in terms rejected the 'modern 'notice'
theory of pleading' as here insufficient and said that an antitrust complaint must 'state a
cause of action instead of merely stating a claim.' " Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319,
324 (2d Cir. 1957) (footnote omitted).
32. Nagler, 248 F.2d at 322-23 (observing that "it is quite clear that the federal rules
contain no special exceptions for antitrust cases" and that under the Rules "outright
dismissal for reasons not going to the merits is viewed with disfavor in the federal courts").
33. Judicial Conference of the Judges of the Ninth Circuit, Claim or Cause of Action:
A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253 (1952). That the Ninth Circuit felt compelled to suggest
such an amendment demonstrates that early critics of notice pleading understood the
Rules as not requiring plaintiffs to plead facts supporting each element of a claim.
34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
35. Of course, a court must also dismiss a complaint when the law does not recognize
a cause of action in the situation alleged. See, e.g., Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326
(1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive
issue of law."); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474-76 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding the
plaintiff failed to state a claim because her suit was barred as a matter of law pending the
completion of her administrative appeal); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 489-94, 498
(4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that defendants had a duty to disclose
certain misrepresentations under federal securities laws and Maryland common law and,
therefore, affirming a dismissal for a failure to state a claim).
36. 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
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Coordination Unit37 and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. 38
A. Conley v. Gibson
The plaintiffs in Conley were a class of black railroad workers
who alleged that their union discriminated against them.39 In their
complaint, the plaintiffs identified a specific incident during which the
union protected white members' jobs at the expense of black
members; however, the complaint also included conclusory,
generalized allegations that the union failed to represent black and
white members equally and in good faith.40 The defendants filed
motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to
join an indispensable party, and failure to state a claim.4 The district
court dismissed on the jurisdictional grounds and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.42 After holding that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
was error, the Supreme Court considered the other arguments for
dismissal, which although not part of the lower courts' decisions, had
been briefed and argued before the Court.
43
In holding that the plaintiffs' complaint was sufficient to survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court stated that the "accepted rule [is]
that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."'  The
Court explicitly rejected the defendants' argument that the complaint
should be dismissed because it did not allege specific facts in support
of its general allegations of discrimination and stated that the Rules
"do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he
bases his claim. '45 Quoting Rule 8(a)(2), the Court explained that all
that is required is " 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will
give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests. '46 The Court noted that the Forms
37. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
38. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
39. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42-43.
40. Id. at 43.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 43-44.
43. Id. at 44-45.
44. Id. at 45-46. At least one commentator has accused the Supreme Court in
pronouncing this test of "conveniently overlook[ing]" the requirement in the second half
of Rule 8(a)(2) that complaints "show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief." Richard L.
Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1755 (1998).
45. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
46. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (stating that a court's task in reviewing the sufficiency of
2004] 1173
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
confirm the existence of a simplified, notice pleading standard and
reiterated Rule 8(f)'s requirement that " 'all pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice.' ""
B. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit
In 1993, the Supreme Court again addressed the Rules' pleading
requirements in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit.8 The plaintiffs in Leatherman alleged that local
police had violated their Fourth Amendment rights by entering the
plaintiffs' homes, assaulting one plaintiff, and killing the other
plaintiff's two dogs.49 In their complaints, the plaintiffs asserted that
the defendant municipal corporations were liable for the officers'
violations of the plaintiff's civil rights because the cities had not
properly trained the officers." The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' § 1983 civil rights claims because the
plaintiffs had failed to allege with factual detail and particularity why
the defendant municipalities were liable for their employees'
conduct.51
Citing Conley's interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2), the Supreme
Court unanimously reaffirmed the existence of a "liberal system of
'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules. 5 2 The Court noted
that Rule 9(b) establishes an exception to this general rule by
requiring parties alleging fraud or mistake to plead with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.53 However, the
Court held that this particularity requirement existed only with
respect to pleading those actions expressly enumerated in Rule 9(b)
and did not, therefore, apply to alleging municipal liability for civil
a complaint "is necessarily a limited one" and concluding that "[t]he issue is not whether a
plaintiff will ultimately prevail .... Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that
a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test"); Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist.
Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959) ("It may well be that petitioner's complaint as now
drawn is too vague, but that is no ground for dismissing his action.").
47. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f)).
48. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
49. Id. at 165.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 165-67.
52. Id. at 168. For early discussions of Leatherman's effect, see McArdle, supra note
14, at 38-42; and Eric Harbrook Cottrell, Note, Civil Rights Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Supreme Court Takes a Look at Heightened
Pleading Standards in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1085, 1099-112 (1994).
53. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
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rights violations under § 1983. 54 In reversing the Fifth Circuit's
dismissal, the Supreme Court cautioned that "federal courts and
litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to
weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.
55
C. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.
The Supreme Court's most recent consideration of pleading
standards and Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals is Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A.56 The plaintiff in Swierkiewicz alleged that Sorema N.A.
terminated his employment on account of his national origin and
age.57 In his complaint, the plaintiff listed his age, his nationality, his
qualifications, his boss's nationality, and the date of his termination.58
The plaintiff also asserted that prior to his termination he had been
demoted and isolated in favor of a younger individual of his boss's
nationality.59 The district court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to
allege a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green6' and dismissed the complaint. 6' The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff
had not alleged facts establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination.62 Specifically, the Second Circuit held that the
plaintiff failed to allege the fourth McDonnell Douglas element,
circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination. 63 The court
held that the plaintiff's "conclusory allegation that his termination
was motivated by national origin discrimination" was "insufficient as
a matter of law to raise an inference of discrimination.'64
After explaining that the McDonnell Douglas requirements for a
prima facie case were not intended or suited to serve as a pleading
54. id.
55. Id. at 168-69.
56. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
57. Id. at 509.
58. Id. at 508-09.
59. Id.
60. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
61. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509.
62. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 5 Fed. Appx. 63, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'd, 534
U.S. 506 (2002).
63. Id. The four elements required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under the McDonnell Douglas framework are (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected
class, (2) the plaintiff was available and qualified for the job, (3) the plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action, and (4) there were circumstances supporting an inference of
discrimination. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing the standard for proving a prima facie case
of racial employment discrimination in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination).
64. Swierkiewicz, 5 Fed. Appx. at 64.
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standard, the Supreme Court considered general pleading
requirements and reaffirmed its holdings in Conley and Leatherman."
The Court again refused to tolerate any extension of particularity
requirements beyond the limited and explicitly enumerated
exceptions, such as those for fraud and mistake in Rule 9(b).66 The
Court observed that the Forms demonstrate how little is required in
most cases and cited the complaint for negligence in Form 9 as an
example of how simple and brief notice pleadings can be.67
With respect to the specific pleading before it, the Court held
that the complaint "easily satisfie[d] the requirements of Rule 8(a)
because it [gave] respondent fair notice of the basis for [plaintiff's]
claims."68  The Court rejected the defendant's argument that
"lawsuits based on conclusory allegations" should be dismissed and
explicitly held that a pleading's sufficiency must be determined
"without regard to whether a claim will succeed on the merits. '69
Unmeritorious claims should be handled through summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 56.70 The Court also instructed that where a
complaint "fails to specify the allegations," a defendant's proper
response is to "move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e)
before responding."'" Confronted with a vague complaint, a
defendant should demand adequate notice, not challenge the
complaint's legal sufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6).
65. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510-14.
66. Id. at 513.
67. Id. at 513 n.4.
68. Id. at 514.
69. Id. at 514-15.
70. Id. at 514. Rule 56 authorizes any party to move for summary judgment and
states:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
71. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-
98 (1998) (instructing trial judges to use motions under Rule 12(e) to protect public
officials against insubstantial claims). Rule 12(e) provides:
If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive
pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a
responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and
the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not
obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within such other time as the
court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed
or make such order as it deems just.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
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The Court in Swierkiewicz reaffirmed the basic Rule 12(b)(6)
standard set out in Conley: " '[A] court may dismiss a complaint only
if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that
could be proved consistent with the allegations.' ",72 Under this
standard, a court can grant a motion to dismiss only where the
plaintiff either has mistakenly pled himself out of court by alleging
specific, detrimental facts that affirmatively preclude all legal relief,
or where the plaintiff has lost on a question of law that has left him
with no legal remedy for the situation his complaint describes.
Absent these circumstances, defendants must address any failures of
omission or vagueness in a complaint through a Rule 12(e) motion for
a more definite statement. The Court's holdings require plaintiffs to
allege the elements of their claims only to the extent necessary to give
notice of what the suit is about. If the plaintiff responds to the Rule
12(e) motion by alleging specific facts inconsistent with any valid
theory of recovery, then the court can grant a motion to dismiss. If
the plaintiff's response does not preclude recovery as a matter of law
but nonetheless appears factually implausible with respect to a
necessary element of the claim, then the court can allow limited
discovery regarding that element and grant a motion for summary
judgment if the plaintiff's proof is lacking.73
Through its unanimous opinions in Conley, Leatherman, and
Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the
existence of a simple notice pleading standard under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under these decisions and the language of
the Rules, a plaintiff need only meet two modest conditions to survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: his complaint must give the defendant fair
notice of the nature and grounds of claim against him, and there must
exist the possibility of some set of facts that could be proved
consistent with the plaintiff's allegations upon which relief could be
granted. This approach rests upon the rationale that summary
judgment and the trial judge's broad control of discovery, not
dismissal on the pleadings, are the proper mechanisms for controlling
and disposing of claims lacking factual merit.
72. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73
(1984)).
73. See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 598-99.
2004] 1177
1178 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
III. THE FACTUAL PLEADING REQUIREMENTS IN THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT
Although a clear majority of the courts of appeals now
acknowledge and follow the Supreme Court's notice pleading
decisions,74 the Fourth Circuit has not. Instead, the Fourth Circuit's
prevailing approach to Rule 12(b)(6) motions requires plaintiffs to
plead facts supporting the existence of each element of a valid cause
of action, often with sufficient factual details to establish, if proven, a
prima facie case of the claim alleged.75 This factual pleading standard,
74. See Phillip v. Univ. of Rochester, 316 F.3d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 2003) (acknowledging
the impact of Swierkiewicz and holding conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent
sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Goad v. Mitchell, 2002 FED App. 0250P, 7
(6th Cir.), 297 F.3d 497, 501 (describing a requirement to plead specific, factual allegations
as imposing an invalid, heightened pleading standard); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d
1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508, for the proposition that
"there is no requirement in federal suits of pleading the facts or the elements of a claim");
Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 564 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512-13,
for the proposition that a complaint need "not [contain] a detailed recitation of the proof
that will in the end establish such a right"); Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir.
2002) ("A complaint that complies with the federal rules of civil procedure cannot be
dismissed on the ground that it is conclusory or fails to allege facts."); Everett-Dicko v.
Ogden Entm't Servs., 36 Fed. Appx. 245, 247 (9th Cir. 2002) (mem.) (holding that the
conclusory statements in the plaintiffs' complaint that "the defendants acted as they did
'because of [Everett-Dicko's] race or color' " and " 'because [the plaintiffs] opposed racial
or color discrimination' " were sufficient allegations of discrimination under
Swierkiewicz); Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir.
2001) ("[T]he liberal 'notice pleading' standards embodied in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) do not require that a plaintiff specifically plead every element of a cause
of action."); Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[C]omplaints 'need not
plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory ......."(quoting Bennett v.
Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998))); Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984
F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Dismissal is appropriate 'as a practical matter.., only in
the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the
complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief.' " (alteration in original) (quoting
Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974))). But see Torres-Viera v. Laboy-
Alvarado, 311 F.3d 105, 108 (1st Cir. 2002) (requiring plaintiffs to plead facts sufficient to
permit the court to draw a "reasonable inference" as to the existence of necessary
elements, such as malicious intent).
For discussion of early attempts by courts of appeals to impose heightened, factual
pleading requirements in conflict with Conley, see McArdle, supra note 14, at 31-36; and
Cottrell, supra note 52, at 1094-97. For an account of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals's
use of Rule 7(a) in Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1429-33 (5th Cir. 1995), to impose
heightened pleading by requiring plaintiffs to make a detailed reply to defendants'
answers, see Eric Kugler, A 1983 Hurdle: Filtering Meritless Civil Rights Litigation at the
Pleading Stage, 15 REV. LITIG. 551, 561-66 (1996).
75. See, e.g., Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F.3d 769, 772 (4th
Cir. 2003) (stating the Rule 12(b)(6) standard as "whether [the plaintiff's] pleadings
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exemplified by cases such as Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming
International, Inc. ,76 lodice v. United States," and Dickson v. Microsoft
Corp.,78 contradicts established Supreme Court case law and the
example set by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Forms. Some
Fourth Circuit panels have, however, appeared to deviate from the
circuit's factual pleading standard by reversing the granting of
motions to dismiss based on a standard closer to the notice pleading
standard that the Supreme Court has identified.79
A. Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming International, Inc.
Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming International, Inc.8" is
representative of the line of Fourth Circuit opinions in which the
court has required plaintiffs to plead a prima facie case.8" The
plaintiffs in Migdal, shareholders of several mutual funds, sued their
funds' investment advisers for breach of their fiduciary duties under
the Investment Company Act ("ICA").82 The plaintiffs alleged
breach in two respects: (1) the advisers took excessive fees, and (2)
the fund directors received compensation for serving on other boards
adequately state a set of facts, which, if proven to be true, would entitle [the plaintiff] to
judicial relief"); Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003)
("[A] plaintiff is required to allege facts that support a claim for relief."); Iodice v. United
States, 289 F.3d 270, 280-81 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to allege
"facts sufficient to state the substantive elements of their claim"); Migdal v. Rowe Price-
Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 327-30 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that "a plaintiff must
allege facts that, if true, would support a claim"); Chisolm v. TranSouth Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d
331, 338 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Inasmuch as the appellants did not specifically plead reliance,
we can hardly fault the district court for faithfully applying our precedents and dismissing
the complaint."); Estate Constr. Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding Co., 14 F.3d 213, 220-21
(4th Cir. 1994); see also Keene v. Thompson, 232 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579 (M.D.N.C. 2002)
("[I]f a complaint fails to sufficiently state facts to support each element of the claims
asserted therein, dismissal ... is proper."); N.C. Shellfish Growers Ass'n v. Holly Ridge
Assocs., 200 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554 (E.D.N.C. 2001) ("A complaint may be dismissed for
failure to state facts sufficient to allege all elements of a claim."); Falwell v. Executive
Office of the President, 158 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741 (W.D. Va. 2001) (stating that to survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff "must allege facts that, if proven, would sustain a ...
claim").
76. 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001).
77. 289 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2002).
78. 309 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2002).
79. See Byrd v. Baltimore Sun Co., 43 Fed. Appx. 702 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam);
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999); Jordan by Jordan v.
Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338-40 (4th Cir. 1994).
80. 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001).
81. The defendant in Swierkiewicz unsuccessfully cited Migdal to the Supreme Court
as authority supporting dismissal of the plaintiff's conclusory complaint. Brief for
Respondent at 14-15, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (No. 00-1853).
82. Migdal, 248 F.3d at 324.
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and were not, therefore, disinterested parties as the ICA requires."
The district court granted a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice on
the grounds that the plaintiffs had not pled sufficient facts.' The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal because the plaintiffs had failed
to "allege facts that, if true, would support a claim that the fees at
issue are excessive" and "failed to allege any facts that, if true, would
support a claim that the disinterested directors were actually
interested.
85
In Migdal, as in many other of its Rule 12(b)(6) opinions, the
Fourth Circuit began by quoting Conley but went on to qualify or
implement the standard to impose a factual pleading requirement
that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's binding interpretations
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.86 Specifically, the Fourth
Circuit repeatedly stated in Migdal that a plaintiff must allege facts to
support his claim and cannot simply plead in a conclusory manner
that he has a particular claim against a defendant.87 The court
explained that this requirement is necessary to control discovery
costs88 and stated that "plaintiffs cannot simply promise the court that
once they have completed discovery, something will turn up."89
Both the holding and rationale in Migdal are in direct conflict
with Conley, Leatherman, and Swierkiewicz. The Migdal court
required "facts that, if true, would support a claim," 90 while the
Conley Court said that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases
his claim." 91 Where the Migdal court reasoned that Rule 12(b)(6)
83. Id. at 325.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 327, 330.
86. Id. at 325-26.
87. Id. at 326-28. Although the Migdal court did not do so, in some Fourth Circuit
opinions, such as Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001), the court has
supported its prohibition on conclusory allegations by citing the Supreme Court's
observation in Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley,
500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)), that "the court may insist
that the plaintiff 'put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations' that establish
improper motive." This reliance is misplaced because the Court also stated in Crawford-
El that the mechanisms by which a trial court can require the plaintiff to put forward more
specifics are ordering a reply to defendant's answer under Rule 7(a) or granting a motion
for a more definite statement under Rule-12(e). See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 597-98. The
Court in Crawford-El does not hold that conclusory allegations are grounds for dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6).
88. Migdal, 248 F.3d at 326.
89. Id. at 328.
90. Id. at 327.
91. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957).
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dismissals should be used to prevent costly discovery of
unmeritorious claims,9 2 the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz explicitly
rejected arguments that complaints "based on conclusory allegations"
were inconsistent with the Rules' pleading standard.93 In both
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court stated that claims
lacking merit should be dealt with through summary judgment.94 In
contrast to the Fourth Circuit's concern in Migdal about a plaintiff
relying on the discovery process to turn up evidence, the Supreme
Court's rejection of a heightened pleading standard in Swierkiewicz
depended in part on the possibility that plaintiffs would uncover
evidence through discovery that was not available to them at the
pleading stage.95
B. Iodice v. United States
Despite the Supreme Court's clear instructions in Swierkiewicz,
the Fourth Circuit has defiantly persisted in applying its factual
pleading standard. In Iodice v. United States,96 decided just two
months after Swierkiewicz, a Fourth Circuit panel again required
plaintiffs to plead facts supporting each element of their cause of
action. The plaintiffs in Iodice alleged that the Department of
Veterans Affairs had negligently dispensed narcotics to a third party
with the proximate result that the third party killed the plaintiffs'
decedents in a car wreck.97 In examining North Carolina law, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that a necessary element of the plaintiffs'
negligence claim was that the defendant had knowledge that the third
party was intoxicated and about to drive at the time the defendant
supplied additional intoxicants.98 With this in mind, the Fourth
Circuit then held that the plaintiffs failed to allege such knowledge
and that their negligence claims must, therefore, be dismissed.99 The
Fourth Circuit explained that "[d]ismissal of a complaint for failure to
state facts supporting each of the elements of a claim is, of course,
92. Migdal, 248 F.3d at 326.
93. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002); see also Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) ("[A Rule 12(b) motion], unlike [a motion for
summary judgment], presumes that general allegations embrace those specific facts that
are necessary to support the claim." (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957))).
94. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514; Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993).
95. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512-13.
96. 289 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2002).
97. Id. at 273.
98. Id. at 279-80.
99. Id. at 280.
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proper."'10 As authority for this interpretation of federal procedural
law, the Fourth Circuit cited a state court decision. 01 The court
concluded by citing Swierkiewicz and explaining the Supreme Court's
unanimous reaffirmation of liberal pleading requirements with the
observation that "[e]ven in these days of notice pleadings, a
complaint asserting a negligence claim must disclose 'that each of the
elements is present in order to be sufficient.' ",102 Although
recognizing the existence of Swierkiewicz, the Fourth Circuit thus
persisted in setting a higher pleading standard than the Supreme
Court.
As discussed above, the Rules themselves, through their attached
Forms, belie the assertion that plaintiffs must specifically allege the
presence of each element. Form 9, for example, stands on a simple,
conclusory allegation that the "defendant negligently drove."'13 The
plaintiffs' complaint in Iodice gave the defendant fair notice of the
plaintiffs' claim and its grounds by informing the defendant that it
was being sued for negligently supplying narcotics on a specified date
to a named addict-patient who then collided with the plaintiffs'
vehicle. 1°" Dismissing a negligence complaint for failing to explicitly
allege that the defendant knew the patient would be driving is an
example of the formalistic, "game of skill" pleading approach the
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected.10 5 Not surprisingly, the Iodice
court's decision was inconsistent with the Supreme Court precedent,
and the court was unable to offer any Supreme Court authority to
support its holding.
C. Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.
The Fourth Circuit recently reaffirmed the circuit's requirement
100. Id. at 281.
101. Id. (citing Winters v. Lee, 115 N.C. App. 692, 446 S.E.2d 123 (1994)); cf. Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465, 471 (1965) (reaffirming that in diversity cases "federal courts
are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law" and indicating that a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is a valid federal procedural law unless it conflicts with
the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2075 (2000), or the Constitution).
102. Iodice, 289 F.3d at 281 (citation omitted) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1249 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp.
2001) and citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002))).
103. See FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 9.
104. lodice, 289 F.3d at 274.
105. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957); see also Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d
1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002),
for the proposition that "there is no requirement in federal suits of pleading the facts or
the elements of a claim").
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to plead facts in Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.'0 6 The plaintiffs in
Dickson, Gravity, Incorporated, and its bankruptcy trustees, alleged
that Microsoft Corporation, Compaq Computer Corporation, and
Dell Computer Corporation violated the Sherman Act by entering
into a licensing agreement with anticompetitive provisions. 107 The
district court dismissed the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and denied, on futility grounds, the
plaintiff's motion to file a Second Amended Complaint. 108
In affirming the dismissal, the Dickson majority first noted that
as a matter of substantive law, the Sherman Act requires plaintiffs to
''prove" or have "proof of" market power or share sufficient to show
an unreasonable restraint on trade or anticompetitive effect.' 9
Without acknowledging any difference between substantive and
pleading requirements, the majority translated this proof requirement
into a holding that the plaintiff's complaint "was required to allege
facts which, if proven true, would demonstrate" market power or
share of the personal computer market."' The majority faulted the
plaintiff for not providing a sufficient factual basis in its complaint to
support its allegations of anticompetitive effects."' In support of
requiring factual allegations, the majority cited Iodice for the
proposition that Swierkiewicz "did not alter the basic pleading
requirement that a plaintiff set forth facts sufficient to allege each
element of his claim."
112
106. 309 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2002).
107. Id. at 198-99.
108. Id. at 200.
109. Id. at 202, 211.
110. Id. at 211.
111. Id. at 212-13.
112. Id. at 213. As discussed in Part II, this requirement to plead facts is fundamentally
inconsistent with the notice pleading standards identified by the Supreme Court and the
Rules. As a sign of the weakness of its position, the Dickson court relied in part on Car
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1984). Dickson, 309 F.3d
at 212-13. Perhaps the Dickson court was tempted by the Seventh Circuit's strong factual
pleading language in Car Carriers. The Seventh Circuit began by acknowledging Conley,
but then observed, "Nonetheless, as this court has recognized, Conley has never been
interpreted literally." Car Carriers, 745 F.2d at 1106 (citing Sutlif, Inc. v. Donovan Cos.,
727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984)). The Dickson court failed to recognize, however, that
the Seventh Circuit abandoned this line of thinking after the Supreme Court did interpret
Conley literally in Leatherman. See, e.g., Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 991 F.2d 417,421 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that dismissal is appropriate "only if the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts that would allow for recovery" and observing that "[h]ere the defendants were put on
notice that compilation was at issue and shall have abundant opportunity to pursue the
matter in detail through the discovery process").
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D. Dissenting Voices Within the Fourth Circuit
The factual pleading requirement displayed in Migdal, Iodice,
and Dickson is not without dissent within the Fourth Circuit. In
Dickson, Judge Gregory dissented from the majority opinion on the
ground that the plaintiff had sufficiently stated its claims to survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion.'13  Citing Swierkiewicz, Judge Gregory
observed that "the Supreme Court has made crystal clear, just this
past term, that an evidentiary standard does not determine the
adequacy of a complaint. It is inappropriate, therefore, to require
plaintiffs to plead facts going to that evidentiary standard in a
complaint.""' 4 Turning to an evaluation of Gravity's pleading, Judge
Gregory cited Conley and observed that the plaintiff's failure to plead
market share did not deprive the defendants of notice of the claims
pending against them and the grounds on which the claims rest. 5
Echoing the Supreme Court's statements in Swierkiewicz, Judge
Gregory concluded, "It is not for us to change the rules of civil
procedure mid-stream. '"16
In another post-Swierkiewicz pleading decision from the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Byrd v. Baltimore Sun Co.,' 7 the court
reversed the dismissal of an employment discrimination complaint."8
The district court granted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the ground that
the plaintiff "failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish a prima
facie discrimination claim... 9 The court vacated and remanded so
that the district court could reconsider the complaint's sufficiency in
light of Swierkiewicz.'2 °
In addition to the per curiam holding in Byrd and Judge
Gregory's dissent in Dickson, a small line of pre-Swierkiewicz cases
exist in which panels of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals have
applied a standard closer to notice pleading. The origin of this line,
which includes Edwards v. City of Goldsboro2' and Cortez v. Prince
113. Dickson, 309 F.3d at 216 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 218 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (citing Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)).
115. Id. at 220 (Gregory, J., dissenting). Judge Gregory concluded that after reading
the plaintiff's fifty-eight pages of detailed allegations, "[tihe defendants in this case know
exactly what conduct is alleged to have violated the antitrust laws, which is all that Rule 8
requires." Id. at 221 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting).
117. 43 Fed. Appx. 702 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
118. Id. at 703.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 178 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1999).
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George's County Maryland,122 is Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson.123
Jordan, decided shortly after Leatherman, involved a § 1983 claim
against a Virginia county and the Commissioner of the Virginia
Department of Social Services. 124 At issue was the plaintiffs' failure
to plead the existence of multiple incidents of misconduct in support
of their allegation that county policies had caused a violation of their
constitutional rights. 25 Citing Leatherman, the Fourth Circuit in
Jordan observed that there is no requirement to "plead the multiple
incidents of constitutional violations that may be necessary at later
stages. ' 126 The court held that the plaintiffs in Jordan had given the
county notice of the nature and grounds of the claim and reversed the
district court's dismissal. 127  The court also cited Leatherman's
admonishment that control of discovery and summary judgment
motions, not Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, are the proper mechanisms for
addressing unmeritorious suits. 128  Unfortunately, neither the
extensive pleadings at issue in Jordan, nor those in its progeny, tested
the Fourth Circuit's willingness to adopt a simple notice pleading
standard where a plaintiff has entirely omitted an element. Thus,
even these Jordan decisions can be read as consistent with other
Fourth Circuit decisions, such as Iodice, that require plaintiffs to
plead the existence of each element.
129
Several district courts in the Fourth Circuit have, however,
deviated from circuit precedent and applied the Supreme Court's
notice pleading standard. In Jennings v. University of North
Carolina,3' for example, the Chief Judge of the Middle District of
North Carolina denied a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and held that the
plaintiffs' conclusory allegation did not warrant dismissal because the
Rules do not require plaintiffs to plead specific facts."' The judge
122. 31 Fed. Appx. 123 (4th Cir. 2002) (unpublished per curiam).
123. 15 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1994).
124. Id. at 337.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 339.
127. Id. at 340.
128. Id.
129. See Cortez v. Prince George's County, Md., 31 Fed. Appx. 123, 129 (4th Cir. 2002)
(unpublished per curiam) (dismissing with respect to those civil rights injuries where the
plaintiff failed to allege that a county policy or custom produced the injuries); Jordan, 15
F.3d at 338 ("Section 1983 plaintiffs ... must.., adequately plead and prove the existence
of an official policy .... ").
130. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 240 F. Supp. 2d 492 (M.D.N.C. 2002).
131. Id. at 502; see also Smith v. Chambers, No. 2:02CV10152, 2002 WL 31906277, at *1
(W.D. Va. Dec. 31, 2002) (slip opinion) ("While the plaintiff has not described in his
Complaint the facts surrounding such entrustment, the defendants have discovery
available to them in order to ascertain such facts."); Miller v. SMS Schloemann-Siemag,
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reasoned that "conclusory statements can provide fair notice to
Defendants of alleged misconduct.
132
IV. POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS FOR REQUIRING FACTUAL PLEADINGS
On the rare occasions when it has given an explanation of its
factual pleading requirements, the Fourth Circuit has asserted it
believes that Rule 12(b)(6) "is not without meaning" and should
operate as a screen against seemingly meritless claims.133 The court's
concern seems to stem primarily from its unwillingness to allow
obviously futile suits to progress into discovery. 134 The court seems
particularly unwilling to let weak cases go forward against defendants
in situations where substantial discovery is likely to result. 35 In
Migdal, for example, the Fourth Circuit stated, "This requirement [to
plead facts] serves to prevent costly discovery on claims with no
underlying factual or legal basis."'36  The court's concern about
undeserved discovery costs is especially pronounced where the
plaintiff has refused to plead factual details after the trial court has
afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. 37
A desire to conserve judicial resources may also be motivating
judges who have persisted in requiring factual pleadings. 138  When
Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (noting that "an element-by-element
analysis is unnecessary under notice-pleading standards"); cf Cockerham v. Stokes
County Bd. of Educ., _ F. Supp. 2d __, 2004 WL 237754, at *3-7 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 3,
2004) (following Fourth Circuit precedent requiring plaintiffs to plead facts supporting
each element of their claims but observing that this "heightened pleading standard"
imposed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals directly conflicts with the Supreme
Court's "clear pronouncement" in Swierkiewicz).
132. Jennings, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
133. Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001); cf
Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in
Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 960 (1990) (discassing the
perception of many federal courts that a heightened pleading standard is necessary in civil
rights cases because the vast majority of such actions are frivolous).
134. See Migdal, 248 F. 3d at 326.
135. See generally Brief for Respondent at 34-40, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506 (2002) (No. 00-1853) (discussing the costs of allowing conclusory allegations of
discrimination to survive motions to dismiss).
136. Migdal, 248 F.3d at 326. The court continued that " '[c]onclusory allegations in a
complaint, if they stand alone, are a danger sign that the plaintiff is engaged in a fishing
expedition.' " Id. (quoting DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55
(1st Cir. 1999)).
137. See Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 209 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123
S. Ct. 2605 (2003) (observing critically that the district court gave the plaintiff "ample
opportunity to allege facts," but the plaintiff "refused" to take advantage of that
opportunity).
138. See id. at 212-13 (citing a section of Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d
1101, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1984), in which the Seventh Circuit discussed the costs of litigation
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they believe a claim will not survive a summary judgment motion,
some judges may feel that the Supreme Court's instruction to deny a
motion to dismiss even where "recovery is very remote and
unlikely" '139 is wasteful and absurd. Additionally, because most
plaintiffs do file extensive pleadings, 4 ° some judges may have come to
expect them.
V. HARMS OF FACTUAL PLEADING REQUIREMENT DECISIONS
Despite their apparent appeal to some judges, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals's factual pleading requirements are harmful and
unjustified. The court's defiance of clear Supreme Court precedent
and the plain language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
violates stare decisis and exceeds the court's constitutional authority
to interpret legislation. The discrepancy between the Fourth Circuit's
and the increasing caseload of the federal courts).
139. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
140. See generally Marcus, supra note 44, at 1768-69 (discussing discovery scope,
default judgment, and early resolution incentives for filing extensive pleadings).
In the Fourth Circuit, where courts still routinely dismiss complaints for failing to
plead facts, plaintiffs' filing of detailed factual pleadings must be motivated in part by a
desire to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal under Fourth Circuit precedent. However, even
without the Fourth Circuit's erroneous factual pleading requirement, several legitimate
reasons remain for plaintiffs to file detailed factual complaints. Discovery is costly for all
sides. Plaintiffs relying on uncertain legal theories can avoid a great deal of wasted effort
and expense by pleading their case in detail and getting early rulings on their legal
arguments. Attorneys may also wish to use their first court filing to impress their clients
by demonstrating their thoroughness and advocacy skills. Laying out a factually detailed
and persuasive case in the complaint may also serve a negotiation posturing function.
Finally, by alleging each element of their claims in detail, plaintiffs may position
themselves for a more searching discovery.
The main disincentive against filing detailed complaints is that plaintiffs may plead
themselves out of court by needlessly alleging facts that turn out to be incompatible with
any theory of recovery. See, e.g., Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557, 558-59 (7th Cir. 1994)
("[I]f a plaintiff does plead particulars, and [the defendants] show that he has no claim,
then he is out of luck-he has pleaded himself out of court."). This is especially a concern
for plaintiffs who have brought a case primarily for its settlement value. Even if the
parties know a case is sure to be dismissed at the summary judgment stage, clearing the
pleading stage and gaining access to discovery increases a suit's settlement value. See, e.g.,
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975) (observing that suits
unlikely to succeed at trial still have settlement value so long as they are able to survive a
motion to dismiss); David A. Curran, Note, Funds v. Big Tobacco and the Proximate-
Cause Issue: A Framework for Derivative Injuries, 80 TEX. L. REv. 393, 426 (2001)
("[S]imply surviving a motion to dismiss dramatically increases the settlement value of a
claim."); Laurae Rossi, Note, Choosing the Best Standard of Pleading Under the 1995
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, and Why the Ninth Circuit's Standard Under In re
Silicon Graphics Conquers the Battle of the Circuits, 31 Sw. U. L. REv. 263, 275 (2002)
(noting a link between settlement value and survival of a motion to dismiss that is
"irrespective of the merits of plaintiff's case").
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pleading requirements and the Supreme Court's holdings creates
uncertainty for litigants filing claims in the Fourth Circuit and
deprives plaintiffs of their procedural rights under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. While potentially blocking some meritless claims,
factual pleading requirements can also deny legitimate plaintiffs
access to discovery and their day in court. Moreover, protecting
defendants and judicial resources from meritless claims does not
require heightened pleading standards given the Rules' existing
mechanisms for sanctioning groundless pleadings, controlling
discovery, and disposing of cases through summary judgment.
A. Defiance of Rules and Court
The Constitution gives Congress the authority to regulate
procedural practices in federal courts.141  In the first instance, this
legislative authority rests entirely with Congress. 42  However,
Congress has exercised this power by delegating rule drafting
responsibilities to the Supreme Court subject to a statutory process of
congressional review. 143  As the Supreme Court has consistently
observed, changes in federal pleading requirements " 'must be
obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by
judicial interpretation.' "
By imposing a pleading standard contrary to the notice pleading
prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals has intruded upon Congress's Article I
legislative authority. 145 When a federal appeals court refuses to abide
141. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted
power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts .... ); see U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
142. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) ("[T]he sovereignty of Congress,
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects .... ).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000) ("The Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts .... ); id. § 2074(a) ("The Supreme Court shall transmit to
the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed under section
2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule."). See generally Karen Nelson
Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1041-73 (1993) (discussing the process by which Congress and the
Supreme Court promulgate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
144. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
145. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 66 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 'as binding as any statute duly enacted by
Congress, and federal courts have no more discretion to disregard the Rule[s'] mandate
than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory provisions.' " (alteration in original)
(quoting Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988))).
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by the requirements of federal law, the behavior undermines the
integrity of the legal system as a whole. 4 6 Nor can the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals claim that it is merely interpreting the language of
the Rules since the Supreme Court has clearly settled the meaning of
Rule 8(a)(2).1
4 7
Perhaps even more disturbing is the Fourth Circuit's refusal to
follow repeated, unanimous Supreme Court precedent rejecting
factual pleading requirements. 48  The court's actions violate
fundamental stare decisis principles, sadly refuting Chief Justice
Rehnquist's assertion that "[t]his principle is so firmly established in
our jurisprudence that no lower court would deliberately refuse to
follow the decision of a higher court.' 1 49 As the Supreme Court noted
in Hutto v. Davis,15 "unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the
federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by
the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those
courts may think it to be."'' The refusal of an inferior court to follow
the decisions of the Supreme Court is an indefensible attack on the
basic structure of the federal judicial system under Article III of the
United States Constitution.
15 2
B. Effect on Plaintiffs
The Fourth Circuit's refusal to abide by the directives of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court puts
litigants in the Fourth Circuit in a difficult and uncertain situation.
Supreme Court precedent and the Rules provide that a plaintiff in
federal court may file a "short and plain statement"'53 along the lines
146. See McArdle, supra note 14, at 37 ("This is not an insignificant point.... [I]n
disregarding the Supreme Court's promulgated and congressionally approved Rule 8 by
demanding fact pleading of certain plaintiffs, the subject federal courts were acting
lawlessly, or surely beyond their constitutional and statutory authority; a matter of no
small consequence.").
147. See supra Part II.
148. Compare, e.g., Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 212-13 (4th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2605 (2003) (refusing to accept "conclusory" assertions and
affirming dismissal for failure "to allege facts which, if true, would establish [the plaintiff's
claims]"), with, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512, 514 (holding that heightened pleading
requirements conflict with Rule 8(a)(2) and allowing a lawsuit "based on conclusory
allegations of discrimination to go forward").
149. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 720 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
150. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
151. Id. at 375; see also Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 713 n.13 ("We would have thought it self-
evident that the lower courts must adhere to our precedents.").
152. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme court ... .
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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of the negligence complaint in Form 9.154 However, a plaintiff who
files such a complaint in the Fourth Circuit risks having his claim
dismissed under contrary Fourth Circuit case law. Dismissals under
Rule 12(b)(6) operate as adjudications upon the merits unless the
district court expressly grants leave to file an amended complaint.
15
1
Even where a district court grants leave to amend, and the plaintiffs
acquiesce to the loss to their statutory right to notice pleading by
attempting to file an amended complaint that satisfies the Fourth
Circuit's factual pleading requirement, there is still a risk that the
plaintiffs will have their amended complaint dismissed because they
inadvertently fail to allege every element to the court's satisfaction.
In the Fourth Circuit, pleading can become an end unto itself, in
which one misstep can potentially deny a plaintiff his day in court and
decision on the merits. 5 6 It is worth remembering that such "game of
skill" pleading practices were found wanting under the Field Code
and common law pleading systems and eliminated by the reforms of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.157 Even if the courts allow
plaintiffs leave to amend their complaints and all legitimate claims
eventually go forward, the time wasted on pleading motions and
responses in the Fourth Circuit as a result of the circuit's factual
pleading requirement is not insubstantial.
The Fourth Circuit's factual pleading requirement inflicts its
worst harm on plaintiffs who cannot plead facts sufficient to establish
every element of their claims because much of the evidence they
would need to do so is in the defendants' exclusive possession.
Where plaintiffs need discovery, a heightened pleading requirement
is in practice dispositive of many claims.159 Without the defendants'
154. FED. R. Civ. P. FORM 9.
155. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). But cf Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497, 503 (2001) (holding that an "adjudication upon the merits" under Rule 41(b)
does not necessarily have claim-preclusive effects).
156. Cf Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) ("The Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive
to the outcome ....").
157. See id.; supra notes 3-24 and accompanying text.
158. Ironically, antitrust cases and discrimination cases, both of which courts have in
the past targeted for heightened pleading requirements, are situations where much of the
evidence is likely to be in the defendants' possession. E.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (noting in an employment discrimination case that
"the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision"); Poller
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (noting in an antitrust case that "the
proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators").
159. See, e.g., Blaze, supra note 133, at 962-63 (observing that requiring factual
allegation before discovery "imposes an enormous burden that many civil rights plaintiffs
find insuperable"); Main, supra note 19, at 330 ("Facts to support allegations of civil rights
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evidence, plaintiffs cannot survive a motion to dismiss; and without
surviving a motion to dismiss, they cannot conduct the discovery
necessary to obtain evidence from the defendants. By precluding
discovery and, thus, review on the merits, factual pleading
requirements invert the basic spirit of the Rules and can operate to
deny justice to plaintiffs with legitimate claims.
16
C. Unnecessary in Light of the Rules' Other Mechanisms
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, given the other
mechanisms available under the Rules, factual pleading requirements
are unnecessary.16' The Rules' liberal notice pleading standard is only
one part of a comprehensive procedural scheme 162 that includes
pretrial case management, 63  control of discovery, 64  summary
judgment,65 motions for a more definite statement, 66 and good faith
pleading 67 and discovery request 6" certifications. Through the use of
these other mechanisms, courts can dispose of unmeritorious suits
and protect defendants from unjustified discovery costs without
resorting to heightened pleading requirements that deny justice to
plaintiffs with legitimate claims.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that summary
judgment and control of discovery, not Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, are
the proper mechanisms for dealing with unmeritorious claims.169 The
Rules give trial judges broad discretion to control the scope, order,
violations are, however, more often than not, in the hands of the defendants. Accordingly,
the imposition of a burden to plead specific factual allegations can be dispositive of many
civil rights claims and have a chilling effect on still others.").
160. Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden
Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1023, 1026-27 (1989) (discussing the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a reform response to the Code system that unfairly
required plaintiffs to plead facts before discovery).
161. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002); Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-
48; McArdle, supra note 14, at 47 ("Detailed pleadings are wholly unnecessary in this
scheme of procedure.").
162. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 (observing that "[o]ther provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inextricably linked to Rule 8(a)'s simplified notice
pleading standard").
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
165. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).
167. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
169. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993); Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
20041 1191
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
extent, and timing of discovery. 7 ' Where one or more elements of a
plaintiff's claim are particularly suspect, judges can limit initial
discovery to those suspect elements and allow the defendant to move
for summary judgment on the basis of that limited discovery before
the case moves into a full discovery period. 7' On such a motion for
summary judgment, the burden of production is, of course, squarely
on the plaintiff.
17 2
For example, in Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,'73 the trial court
could have allowed limited discovery on the issue of market power
and then granted a motion for summary judgment if the plaintiff
could not meet its burden of production.'74 It seems unlikely that
such an inquiry would have imposed an undue burden on the
defendants. This procedure would have comparable efficiency and
cost benefits to a factual pleading requirement without doing violence
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Likewise, rather than
denying the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove their claim because of a
pleading failure, the trial court in Iodice v. United States'75 could have
permitted the plaintiffs at least a few short interrogatories and limited
depositions seeking information about whether the hospital's
employees "knew or should have known" that their "patient was
under the influence of alcohol or narcotics" and would be driving
shortly.'
7 6
Rule 11 can also limit the burden that meritless claims impose.
Specifically, Rule 11 requires attorneys to certify that "allegations and
other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after...
discovery."' 77 Rule 26(g), in turn, requires sanction of parties who
make discovery requests to harass or unreasonably burden the other
party.'78 Entirely vague complaints can be dealt with through motions
170. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26.
171. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26, 56.
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial."); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)
(mandating summary judgment where after adequate time for discovery a party "fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial").
173. 309 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2002).
174. See id. at 207; supra Part III.C.
175. 289 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2002).
176. See id. at 280; supra Part III.B.
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
178. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2)-(3).
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under Rule 12(e), compelling plaintiffs to produce more definite
statements that give sufficient notice of the claims to enable
defendants to respond. 79
Moreover, the magnitude of the problems to which proponents
address heightened pleading requirements-a docket crisis and
crushing discovery burden-are somewhat overstated. In the period
from 1984 to 1997, the number of civil filings in federal district courts
remained nearly constant. 10 Between 1997 and 2000, the number of
civil cases pending in federal courts actually decreased by eight
percent.181  And while discovery can undoubtedly be costly in
particular suits, it is worth remembering that little or no discovery
occurs in most federal cases.112
CONCLUSION
The plain language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
history and intent of the Rules, and settled Supreme Court precedent
establish that the requirements for surviving a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim are modest. 8 3 First, a plaintiff's complaint
must contain " 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests. ' 1 4 Second, " '[a] court may dismiss a
complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any
set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.' "185
179. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,514 (2002).
180. John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a Federal Case out of
It... in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 151 n.24 (2001) (citing EXAMINING
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1997: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT
STATISTICS PROJECT 13 (Brian Ostrom & Neal Kauder eds., 1998)) (reporting that
federal filings increased by only four percent compared to a twenty-eight percent increase
in state trial courts during the same period).
181. Id. (citing L.R. MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:
2000 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 22 (2001)) (reporting that federal trial judges were
assigned an average of 500 cases in 2000).
182. See Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1794, 1798 (2002) ("Empirical studies of discovery have repeatedly disclosed that for
most cases in federal court no discovery occurs, or only a few hours are devoted to it.").
See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1393, 1393-445 (1994) (arguing that allegations of massive discovery abuse are largely
myth, not fact).
183. See supra Parts I-II.
184. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIv.
P. 8(a)(2)).
185. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
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So long as notice is satisfied, conclusory allegations are sufficient at
the pleading stage, and federal courts must evaluate complaints
without regard to the likelihood that the plaintiffs will eventually be
able to prove sufficient facts to succeed on the merits.
186
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, continues to defy
the Federal Rules Civil Procedure and forty-five years of Supreme
Court precedent by requiring plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient to
support each element of their claims.'87 The court's decisions violate
bedrock stare decisis and separation of powers principles and create
uncertainty for plaintiffs filing claims in the Fourth Circuit. 18  The
Fourth Circuit's factual pleading requirement deprives plaintiffs of
their procedural rights and unfairly injures those plaintiffs who need
discovery to obtain evidence.189 The court's heightened pleading
standard is particularly unjustified in light of the numerous
alternative mechanisms for early and efficient disposition of
unmeritorious claims under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 190
Although several judges within the Fourth Circuit have begun to
follow the Supreme Court's pleading precedent, 191 until all Fourth
Circuit judges faithfully adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the circuit's heightened pleading standard will continue to
harm plaintiffs and the integrity of the judicial system.
KOAN MERCER
186. See id. at 514-15.
187. See supra Parts III.A-C.
188. See supra Parts V.A-B.
189. See supra Part V.B.
190. See supra Part V.C.
191. See supra Part III.D.
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